Economics at your fingertips  

Monetary Union in West Africa; Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why?

Paul Masson (), Xavier Debrun () and Catherine A Pattillo

No 02/226, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We develop a multicountry model in which governments aim at excessive spending in order to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. This puts pressure on the monetary authorities to extract seigniorage, and thus affects the incentives countries would have to participate in a monetary union. This feature, ignored by the monetary union literature for Europe, is potentially important in Africa. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. We conclude that monetary union with Nigeria would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries, unless it were accompanied by effective discipline over Nigeria's fiscal policies.

Keywords: Central banks and their policies; Africa; Fiscal policy; Monetary unions; West Africa; Monetary union, fiscal distortions, inflation, monetary policy, terms of trade, International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain, who might lose, and why? (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jim Beardow ().

Page updated 2019-12-12
Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:02/226