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The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors; Principles and Practice

Michael Taylor, Marc Quintyn and Eva Hüpkes ()

No 05/51, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Policymakers' uneasiness about granting independence to financial sector regulators stems to a large extent from the lack of familiarity with, and elusiveness of, the concept of accountability. This paper gives operational content to accountability and argues that it is possible to do so in a way that encourages and supports agency independence. The paper first elaborates on the role and purposes of accountability. Second, it shows that the unique features of financial sector supervision point to a more complex system of accountability arrangements than, for instance, the conduct of monetary policy. Finally, the paper discusses specific arrangements that can best secure the objectives of accountability and, thus, independence. Our findings have a wider application than financial sector supervision.

Keywords: Central banks; Financial regulation, regulatory agencies, public administration accountability, banking, financial system, financial services, financial sector, financial institutions, General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation, Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation, Governmental Property, Economics of Regulation, Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: General, International, or Comparative, (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2005-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-fmk
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Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/51