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Fragmented Politics and Public Debt

Ernesto Crivelli (), Sanjeev Gupta, Carlos Mulas-Granados and Carolina Correa-Caro

No 16/190, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: In this paper, we study the impact of fragmented politics on public debt—in particular, between two consecutive legislative elections. Using data for 92 advanced and developing countries during 1975-2015, we find a positive association between political fragmentation and public debt changes. Corruption magnifies the effects; with higher perceived corruption, political fragmentation has a bigger sway on debt increases. The influence of political fragmentation on debt dynamics is somewhat asymmetric, with larger and more significant effects during periods of debt reduction. Establishment of fiscal councils helps attenuate the negative impact of political fragmentation on public debt dynamics.

Keywords: Public debt; Developing countries; Developed countries; Cross country analysis; Econometric models; Time series; Public debt; political fragmentation; common pool; veto players (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2016-09-19
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