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Competition and Bank Risk the Role of Securitization and Bank Capital

Yener Altunbas (), David Marques‐Ibanez, Michiel Van Leuvensteijn and Tianshu Zhao
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Marques-Ibanez ()

No 19/140, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: We examine how bank competition in the run-up to the 2007–2009 crisis affects banks’ systemic risk during the crisis. We then investigate whether this effect is influenced by two key bank characteristics: securitization and bank capital. Using a sample of the largest listed banks from 15 countries, we find that greater market power at the bank level and higher competition at the industry level lead to higher realized systemic risk. The results suggest that the use of securitization exacerbates the effects of market power on the systemic dimension of bank risk, while capitalization partially mitigates its impact.

Keywords: Bank credit; Interest rates on loans; Bank liquidity; Central banks; Bank accounting; Financial crises; securitization,pre-crisis,industry level,individual bank,market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2019-07-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-com and nep-rmg
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Working Paper: Competition And Bank Risk: The Role Of Securitization And Bank Capital (2013) Downloads
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