Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions
Jay Corrigan () and
Matthew Rousu ()
Working Papers from Kenyon College, Department of Economics
In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.
Keywords: Experimental Auctions; Posted Prices; Affiliation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D12 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ken:wpaper:0602
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