The Pollution Game: A Classroom Exercise Demonstrating the Relative Effectiveness of Emissions Taxes and Tradable Permits
Jay Corrigan ()
Working Papers from Kenyon College, Department of Economics
This classroom exercise illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of various regulatory frameworks aimed at internalizing negative externalities from pollution. Specifically, the exercise divides students into three groups—the government regulatory agency and two polluting firms—and allows them to work through a system of uniform command-and-control regulation, a tradable emissions permit framework, and an emissions tax. Students have the opportunity to observe how flexible, market-oriented regulatory frameworks can outperform inflexible command-and-control. More importantly given the ongoing debate about how best to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, students can also observe how the introduction of abatement-cost uncertainty can cause one market-oriented solution to outperform another.
Keywords: classroom experiments; emissions taxes; pollution; tradable emissions permits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ken:wpaper:0902
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Kenyon College, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jay Corrigan ().