Changing Economic Incentives in Long-Term Care
R. Tamara Konetzka ()
Additional contact information
R. Tamara Konetzka: Department of Health Studies, University of Chicago, 5841 S. Maryland Avenue, MC2007, Chicago, IL 60637
No 32, Center for Policy Research Policy Briefs from Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University
Just as managed care has changed utilization and incentives in other parts of health care, there is a whole set of incentives built around long-term care that really matter. For example, if nursing homes have a financial incentive to hospitalize people with certain health conditions, then in the long run they are not going to develop the programs and invest in the resources to treat those people in the facility. Instead they're going to use those resources to stay in business or to provide other types of care. And while we can assume that policymakers do not create regulations that they expect will lead to poor quality, efforts to increase access or efficiency sometimes have the unintended consequence of reducing quality. Health care sectors in which spending is rising particularly rapidly or in which access seems to be problematic may be prone to regulations that fail to take into account potential effects on quality. There's a lot of money spent on nursing homes; there's certainly a lot of interest from public funders in nursing homes; and nursing homes have a long history of quality-of-care problems. Not surprisingly, then, some of the most interesting sets of bad incentives for quality can be found in nursing homes.
Keywords: nursing home; Medicare; Medicaid; long-term care; elderly; social welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/cpr/publ ... licy_briefs/pb32.pdf (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:max:cprpbr:32
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Center for Policy Research Policy Briefs from Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University 426 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, New York USA 13244-1020. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Austin () and Candi Patterson () and Katrina Wingle ().