Are defined contribution pension schemes socially sustainable? A conceptual map from a macroprudential perspective
Giuseppe Marotta ()
Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza (CEFIN) (Center for Studies in Banking and Finance) from Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi"
If the combined retirement income, provided by public and private defined contribution (DC) pension schemes, falls below socially acceptable standards, there is a political risk that consensus seeker policymakers could yield to pressures to commit future fiscal revenues. These contingent liabilities, when incorporated in markets’ expectations, are bound to create spillovers on sovereign risk, with negative feedback loops on the capital adequacy of banks and of other intermediaries, owing to losses on their government paper. Among the causes of reduced annuities out of the final assets in DC pension funds is an equity risk premium much lower than the commonly values advertised by the industry and by policymakers. From a macroprudential perspective, this political risk should be taken into account in stress tests assessing banks’ resilience to financial shocks.
Keywords: pensions; equity risk premium; political risk; sovereign risk; stress test (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 G23 H55 J14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age and nep-eec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Are defined contribution pension schemes socially sustainable? A conceptual map from a macroprudential perspective (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mod:wcefin:11101
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Centro Studi di Banca e Finanza (CEFIN) (Center for Studies in Banking and Finance) from Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia, Dipartimento di Economia "Marco Biagi" Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Giuseppe Marotta ().