Delays and Partial Agreements in Multi-Issue Bargaining
Avidit Acharya () and
No 1263, Working Papers from Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program.
We model a situation in which two players bargain over two issues (pies), one of which can only be resolved at a future date. We find that if the players value the issues asymmetrically (one player considers the existing issue more important than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation) then they may delay agreement on the first issue until the second one is finally on the table. If we allow for partial agreements, then the players never leave an issue completely unresolved. They either make a partial agreement on the first issue, and wait for the second one to emerge before completing the agreement; or they come to complete agreements on each of the issues at their earliest possible dates. We discuss applications to legislative bargaining and international trade negotiations.
Keywords: bargaining; multiple issues; delay; hold-up; inefficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pri:metric:wp004.pdf
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