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A Model of Expertise

Vijay Krishna and John Morgan

No 154, Working Papers from Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics

Abstract: We study a model in which two perfectly informed experts offer advice to a decision maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. Experts are biased and thus may wish to pull the decision maker in different directions and to different degrees. When the decision maker consults only a single expert, the expert withholds substantial information from the decision maker. We ask whether this situation is improved by having the decision maker consult a cabinet of (two) experts. We first show that there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium direction, it is never beneficial to consult both. In contrast, when experts are biased in opposite directions, it is always beneficial to consult both. Finally, a cabinet of extremists is of no value.

JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-01
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http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/Experts%20Final%20QJE%20Version.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: A Model of Expertise (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: A Model of Expertise (1999)
Working Paper: A Model of Expertise (1999) Downloads
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