Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size
Jean Hindriks () and
No 436, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
It is shown that altruism does not affect the equilibrium provision of public goods although altruism takes the form of unconditional commitment to contribute. The reason is that altruistic contributions completely crowd out selfish contributions. That is, egoists free ride on altruism. It is also shown that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups.
Keywords: Free Riding; Public good; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size (2002)
Working Paper: Free riding on altruism and group size (2002)
Working Paper: Free Riding on Altruism and Group Size (2001)
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