On the Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Large Games
Nizar Allouch and
Myrna Wooders ()
No 726, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment ε-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem.
Keywords: NTU games; Core; Approximate cores; Small group effectiveness; Coalition formation; Payoff dependent balancedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games (2017)
Working Paper: On the Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Large Games (2014)
Working Paper: On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games (2014)
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