Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets
Daniel Ferreira () and
Radoslawa Nikolowa ()
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Daniel Ferreira: London School of Economics
No 740, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
We develop a model in which competition in the labor market may produce worker-firm matches that are inferior to those obtained in the absence of competition. This result contrasts with the conventional wisdom that competition among employers allocates scarce talent efficiently. In a model in which employers asymmetrically learn about the ability of their workers, we show that constraining labor market competition may be socially desirable precisely because it leads to better talent allocation. The model provides a cautionary counterpoint to one of the most popular arguments against the regulation of pay, i.e., the argument that price-distorting regulation leads to inefficient matches of workers and firms.
Keywords: Labor markets; Asymmetric employer learning; Misallocation; Adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J31 M5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-lma and nep-ltv
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Working Paper: Misallocation of Talent in Competitive Labor Markets (2015)
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