An Experiment on Non-Zero Sum Colonel Blotto Games
Rafael Hortala-Vallve () and
Aniol Llorente-Saguer ()
Additional contact information
Rafael Hortala-Vallve: London School of Economics
No 779, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
We study a version of the Colonel Blotto game where valuations across battlefields are heterogeneous and asymmetric. These games can exhibit unique pure strategy equilibria, some of which are non-monotonic with respect to the battlefield valuations. We test our theoretical predictions in the laboratory and find low initial levels of equilibrium play but substantial learning throughout the experiment. Learning is higher for games with monotonic equilibria. Finally, we find that deviations from equilibrium predictions benefit aggregate welfare.
Keywords: Colonel Blotto; Non-zero sum; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.qmul.ac.uk/sef/media/econ/research/wor ... 2015/items/wp779.pdf (application/pdf)
Working Paper: An Experiment on Non-Zero Sum Colonel Blotto Games (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp779
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nicholas Owen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).