The Distribution of Talent across Contests Feedback in Higher Education
Ghazala Azmat and
Marc Möller ()
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Ghazala Azmat: Queen Mary University of London and Centre for Economic Performance, LSE
No 789, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most-able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? In this paper, we show, theoretically and empirically, that the distribution of abilities plays a crucial role in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high-ability contestants is sufficiently small. As this proportion increases, high-ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, such that, reverse sorting becomes a possibility. We test our theoretical predictions with a large panel data set containing contest choice over twenty years. We use exogenous variation in the participation of highly-able competitors to provide empirical evidence for the relationship among prizes, competition, and sorting.
Keywords: Contests; Competition; Sorting; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L20 M52 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp789
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