EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis

Jeffrey Ely, Romain Gauriot and Lionel Page ()

No 38, QuBE Working Papers from QUT Business School

Abstract: We investigate whether expert players with high incentives are able to optimally determine their degree of risk taking in contest. We use a large dataset on tennis matches and look at players risk taking on first and second serves. We isolate a specic situation, let serves, where second serves and first serves occur in a way which is as good as random. This creates the setting of a quasi-experiment which we can use to study players' serving strategies on first and second serves in comparable serving situations. We find that players, both men and women, are able to adopt serving strategies which meet the requirements of optimality arising from simple assumptions about risk-return trade-offs in serves.

Date: 2016-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://external-apps.qut.edu.au/business/documents ... Ely_Gauriot_Page.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do agents maximise? Risk taking on first and second serves in tennis (2017) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp038

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in QuBE Working Papers from QUT Business School
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipa Sarkar ().

 
Page updated 2022-08-12
Handle: RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp038