Implementation by vote-buying mechanisms
Jon Eguia () and
No 2018-1, Working Papers from Michigan State University, Department of Economics
Simple majority voting does not allow preference intensities to be expressed, and hence fails to implement choice rules that take them into account. A vote-buying mechanism, instead, permits preference intensities to be revealed since each agent can buy any quantity of votes x to cast for an alternative of her choosing at a cost c(x) and the outcome is the most voted alternative. In the context of binary decisions, we characterize the class of choice rules implemented by vote-buying mechanisms. Rules in this class can assign any weight to preference intensities and to the number of supporters for each alternative.
Keywords: implementation; mechanism design; vote-buying; social welfare; utilitarianism; quadratic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-knm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Implementation by vote-buying mechanisms (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:msuecw:2018_001
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