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Implementation by vote-buying mechanisms

Jon Eguia () and Dimitrios Xefteris

No 2018-1, Working Papers from Michigan State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Simple majority voting does not allow preference intensities to be expressed, and hence fails to implement choice rules that take them into account. A vote-buying mechanism, instead, permits preference intensities to be revealed since each agent can buy any quantity of votes x to cast for an alternative of her choosing at a cost c(x) and the outcome is the most voted alternative. In the context of binary decisions, we characterize the class of choice rules implemented by vote-buying mechanisms. Rules in this class can assign any weight to preference intensities and to the number of supporters for each alternative.

Keywords: implementation; mechanism design; vote-buying; social welfare; utilitarianism; quadratic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-knm, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 2018-06-26
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