No 2019-5, Working Papers from Michigan State University, Department of Economics
I present a theory of multi-lateral conflict. Policy-motivated countries launch military interventions in a target country, whose policies are perceived as noxious. A successful intervention leads to a change of regime and a change of policies in the target country. Comparative statics show that an intervention is more likely in a more interconnected world, if the target nation is smaller, or if the policy preferred by the target country’s government is more extreme. To measure the effectiveness of alliances, I develop a measure of “relative sacrifice” in contributions to multilateral interventions. Using Afghanistan (2001-2014) as an illustration, I argue that the relative sacrifice made by the US, the UK, and Canada was high, while all other European NATO allies sacrificed very little.
Keywords: multilateral conflict; regime change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.msu.edu/repec/wp/regime19v5.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:msuecw:2019_005
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Michigan State University, Department of Economics Department of Economics, Michigan State University, 110 Marshall-Adams Hall, 486 W. Circle Dr., East Lansing, MI 48824. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dean Olson III ().