Preference Evolution in Different Marriage Markets
Jiabin Wu () and
No 2020-1, Working Papers from Michigan State University, Department of Economics
We examine the evolution of preferences under different arrangements of the marriage market, when preferences are influenced by own choices and parents’ preferences. Multiple stable equilibria arise under random matching, but a unique equilibrium exists under assortative matching. Differences in evolutionary trajectories after transitory and permanent shocks by marriage markets allow us to discuss in a unified way the evolution of (i) female labor force participation in developed countries, (ii) gender norms in developing countries, (iii) the capitalistic spirit in preindustrial England, and (iv) cultural norms in the long run.
Keywords: preference evolution; marriage market; intergenerational transmission; evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem, nep-des and nep-evo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:msuecw:2020_001
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