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Ostracism and Common Pool Resource Management in a Developing Country: Young Fishers in the Laboratory

Wisdom Akpalu and Peter Martin

No 130, Working Papers from Economic Research Southern Africa

Abstract: This paper investigates how the possibility to ostracise, which is a familiar punishment mechanism to subjects in an experiment, affects harvest in a common pool resource experiment. The experiment was framed as a fishing problem and the subjects were young fishers in Ghana. We find that the introduction of the possibility to ostracise other members of a group at a cost to the remaining members of a group decreased over-fishing significantly in comparison with the situation where ostracism was not possible. The ostracism was based on at least 50 percent voting rule. Moreover, the subjects demonstrated a strong desire to ostracise those who overfished.

Keywords: Common Pool Resource; Experiment; Ostracism; Fishers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-exp
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Journal Article: Ostracism and Common Pool Resource Management in a Developing Country: Young Fishers in the Laboratory (2012) Downloads
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