Evaluating the Prospects of Benefit Sharing Schemes in Protecting Mountain Gorillas in Central Africa
Samson Mukanjari, Edwin Muchapondwa, Precious Zikhali and Birgit Bednar-Friedl
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Birgit Bednar-Friedl (),
Samson Mukanjari and
Edwin Muchapondwa ()
No 321, Working Papers from Economic Research Southern Africa
Presently, the mountain gorilla in Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo is endangered mainly by poaching and habitat loss. This paper sets out to investigate the possible resolution of poaching involving the local community by using benefit sharing schemes with local communities. Using a bioeconomic model, the paper demonstrates that the current revenue sharing scheme yields suboptimal conservation outcomes. It is however shown that a performance-linked benefit sharing scheme in which the Park Agency makes payment to the local community based on the growth of the gorilla stock can achieve socially optimal conservation. This scheme renders poaching effort by the local community, and therefore poaching fines and anti-poaching enforcement towards the local community unnecessary. Given the huge financial outlay requirements for the ideal benefit sharing scheme, the Park Agencies in central Africa could reap more financial benefits for use in conservation if they employ an oligopolistic pricing strategy for gorilla tourism.
Keywords: Benefit sharing; bioeconomic model; conservation; mountain gorilla; performance payment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-env
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Working Paper: Evaluating the Prospects of Benefit Sharing Schemes in Protecting Mountain Gorillas in Central Africa (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rza:wpaper:321
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