Speculative Trade Equilibria with Incorrect Price Anticipations
No 358, Working Papers from Economic Research Southern Africa
This paper introduces an equilibrium concept for boundedly rational agents who base their demand-supply decisions on incorrect price anticipations. Formally, we differentiate between equilibrium and out-of-equilibrium states. If the agents attach zero prior probability to all out-of-equilibrium states, our equilibrium concept coincides with Radner's (1979) concept of rational expectations equilibria (=REE). In contrast to REE, however, there may exist strict incentives for speculative asset trade whenever boundedly rational agents regard out-of-equilibrium states as possible.
Keywords: Bounded Rationality; Speculative Trade; Rational Expectations; Incorrect Prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D51 D53 G02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Speculative Trade Equilibria with Incorrect Price Anticipations (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rza:wpaper:358
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