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Persuasion Meets Delegation

Anton Kolotilin () and Andriy Zapechelnyuk

No 201802, Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics from Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews

Abstract: There are two common ways for a principal to influence the decision making of an agent. One is to manipulate the agent's information (persuasion problem). Another is to limit the agent's decisions (delegation problem). We show that, under general assumptions, these two problems are equivalent; so solving one problem solves the other. We illustrate how the methods developed in the persuasion literature can be applied to address unsolved delegation problems by considering monopoly regulation with a participation constraint.

Keywords: persuasion; delegation; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2018-04-07
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Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2018) Downloads
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