Persuasion Meets Delegation
Anton Kolotilin () and
No 201802, Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance from School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews
A principal can restrict an agent’s information (the persuasion problem) or restrict an agent’s discretion (the delegation problem). We show that these problems are generally equivalent - solving one solves the other. We use tools from the persuasion literature to generalize and extend many results in the delegation literature, as well as to address novel delegation problems, such as monopoly regulation with a participation constraint.
Keywords: persuasion; delegation; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-07, Revised 2020-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2019)
Working Paper: Persuasion Meets Delegation (2018)
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