Censorship as Optimal Persuasion
Anton Kolotilin (),
Tymofiy Mylovanov () and
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Tymofiy Mylovanov: University of Pittsburgh
No 201903, Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance from School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews
A sender designs a signal about the state of the world to persuade a receiver. Under standard assumptions, an optimal signal censors states on one side of a cutoff and reveals all other states. This result holds in continuous and discrete environments with general and monotone partitional signals. The sender optimally censors more information if she is more biased, if she is more certain about the receiver's preferences, and if the receiver is easier to persuade. We apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; information design; censorship; media (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10-03, Revised 2020-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:wpecon:1903
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