Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions
David Davis ()
No 12011, SDSU Working Papers in Progress from South Dakota State University, Department of Economics
US government agencies in WIC infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. This paper investigates whether bidders are more aggressive when buyers band together to jointly offer infant formula contracts. Results suggest that WIC agencies that band together to form an alliance receive stronger bids.
Keywords: auctions; food assistance; countervailing power; buyer concentration; oligopoly; WIC (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 D43 D44 Q18 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages 24 pages
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http://repec-sda.sdstate.edu/repec/sda/pdf/CountevailingPower.pdf Original version (application/pdf)
http://repec-sda.sdstate.edu/repec/sda/pdf/14_5_28 ... -SourceContracts.pdf Revised 2nd version (application/pdf)
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Journal Article: Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions (2014)
Working Paper: Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sda:workpa:12011
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