EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks

Stephen Leider (), Markus M. Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat and Quoc-Anh Do ()

Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po

Abstract: We conducted online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to random strangers, whereas future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24% when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency-enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.

Keywords: Social network; Reciprocity; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (100) Track citations by RSS feed

Published in The Quarterly journal of economics, 2009, vol. 124, pp.1815-1851

Downloads: (external link)
https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/14otokka698n ... irected-altruism.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2008) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/14otokka698nb83lk2n7bhqbo2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Spire @ Sciences Po Library ().

 
Page updated 2020-02-21
Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/14otokka698nb83lk2n7bhqbo2