Test Design Under Falsification
Eduardo Perez () and
Additional contact information
Vasiliki Skreta: University of Texas at Austin
No 2018-13, Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po
We characterize a receiver-optimal test when manipulations are possible in the form of type falsification. Optimal design exploits the following manipulator trade-off: while falsification may lead to better grades, it devalues their meaning. We show that optimal tests can be derived among falsification-proof ones. Our optimal test has a single ‘failing’ grade, and a continuum of ‘passing’ grades. It makes the manipulator indifferent across all moderate levels of falsification. Good types never fail, but bad types may pass. An optimal test delivers at least half of the full-information value to the receiver. A three-grade optimal test also performs well.
Keywords: Information Design; Falsification; Tests; Manipulation; Cheating; Persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/31aa5v8jtp9p ... er-falsification.pdf (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Test Design Under Falsification (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Spire @ Sciences Po Library ().