Corporate Governance And Industrialization
Maurizio Iacopetta () and
Pietro Peretto ()
No 14/2020, Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po
Corporate governance distortions delay or even halt a country's transformation into a modern innovation economy. We investigate the mechanism through a growth model that allows for agency issues within firms. Governance distortions raise the cost of investment and depress the incentives to set up new firms. Modest differences in governance account for large gaps in income: A 32 percent investment cost differential can explain the secular decline of Latin America income relative to that of the USA, and implies an industrialization delay of a third of a century. We obtain similar results for a large number of countries and macro-regions.
Keywords: Corporate governance; Income differences; Secular transition; Modern growth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D58 O14 O16 O43 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-tid
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Journal Article: Corporate governance and industrialization (2021)
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