The Geography of Conflicts and Regional Trade Agreements
Thierry Mayer (),
Mathias Thoenig () and
Philippe Martin ()
Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po
In addition to standard trade gains, regional trade agreements (RTAs) can promote peaceful relations by increasing the opportunity cost of conflicts. Country pairs with large trade gains from RTAs and a high probability of conflict should be more likely to sign an RTA. Using data from 1950 to 2000, we show that this complementarity between economic and politics determines the geography of RTAs. We disentangle trade gains from political factors by a theory-driven empirical estimation and find that country pairs with higher frequency of past wars are more likely to sign RTAs, the more so the larger the trade gains.
JEL-codes: D72 D74 F15 N70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26) Track citations by RSS feed
Published in American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2012, vol. 4, pp.1-35
Downloads: (external link)
https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/f4rshpf3v1um ... ources/mac.4.4.1.pdf (application/pdf)
Journal Article: The Geography of Conflicts and Regional Trade Agreements (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lb0k114o5
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Sciences Po publications from Sciences Po Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Spire @ Sciences Po Library ().