A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption
Haldun Evrenk ()
No 2008-3, Working Papers from Suffolk University, Department of Economics
Using a theoretical model of two-candidate competition, I study the political support for a fully effective and costless reform targeting high level political corruption. I find that when the candidates have a high discount factor, and when the level of political corruption is not too low, both corrupt and honest candidates have incentives to oppose the reform. I also find that a fully informed and fully coordinated electorate can change a candidate's incentives by bundling the reform with high wages and by voting strategically.
Keywords: Political Corruption; Political Economy of Anti-Corruption Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-reg
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