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Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization

Haldun Evrenk ()

No 2010-1, Working Papers from Suffolk University, Department of Economics

Abstract: I study both local and global Nash equilibria of a model of three-candidate unidimensional spatial competition. In the model, candidates may have different non-policy characteristics (valence). Generalizing the base model studied in Evrenk (2009a;b) the model allows for an asymmetric voter density as well as plurality-maximizing candidates. Unlike the standard Hotelling-Downs model of multi-candidate competition, under an asymmetric density with (heterogenous) vote-maximizing candidates a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) exists. Further, this PSNE is free from several non-plausible features of PSNE under a symmetric density. When candidates are plurality-maximizers, some of the PSNE are supported by paradoxical candidate behavior. Further, when voter density is asymmetric and candidates are plurality-maximizers, there are several non-monotonicities in the PSNE.

Keywords: Valence; three-candidate competition; plurality maximization; local Nash equilibrium; asymmetric voter density (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-ure
Date: 2010-02-02
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