Economics at your fingertips  

Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Stochastic Voting

Haldun Evrenk () and Dmitriy Kha ()

No 2010-2, Working Papers from Suffolk University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the effects of stochastic (probabilistic) voting on equilibrium locations, equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogenous candidates and a single-dimensional issue space. Comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting, we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior, the model has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) that is free from several non-plausible features of the PSNE under deterministic voting. The results are robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization.

Keywords: Probabilistic voting; valence; three-candidate competition; centripetal incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
Date: 2010-02-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Suffolk University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Frank Conte ().

Page updated 2019-03-24
Handle: RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-2