Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition
Ana Ania ()
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Schaffer (1988) proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has interesting implications in economic models of evolutionary learning, since it is related to perfectly competitive equilibrium. The present paper explores the relation of this concept to Nash equilibrium in particular classes of games, including constant-sum games, games with weak payoff externalities, and games where imitative decision rules are individually improving. An illustration of the latter is provided in the context of Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous product which allows for a characterization of the set of evolutionarily stable prices.
JEL-codes: B52 C72 D43 D83 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:0601
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