Selection Effects in Regulated Markets
Maarten C.W. Janssen () and
Additional contact information
Maarten C.W. Janssen: http://www.univie.ac.at/Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
This paper analyzes dynamic selection effects that arise in a regulated market where price structures are determined by a regulator or central management. Consumers come in different types where each type requires a different service or treatment. We show that for a large class of price structures some group of customers is refused the service. Equilibria with selection are welfare inferior to equilibria without selection. We also characterize the class of price structures for which selection does not arise. As the number of customers increases or agents become more patient the class of selection-free price structures shrinks and in the limit it is unique. Moreover, all other price structures induce selection. The general model can be applied to a variety of markets, including health care and taxi markets.
JEL-codes: I11 L51 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:0810
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paper Administrator ().