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Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment

Roberto Galbiati, Karl Schlag () and Joel van der Weele ()
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Joel van der Weele: http://www.univie.ac.at/Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: Sanctions are a means to provide incentives towards more pro-social behavior. Yet their implementation can be a signal that past behavior was undesirable. We investigate experimentally the importance of the informational content of the choice to sanction. We place this in a context of a coordination game to focus attention on beliefs and information and less on intrinsic or pro-social motivations. We compare the e ect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who takes the role of a fictitious policy maker with superior information about the previous e ort of the other players. We nd that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which eliminates for them the incentive e ect of sanctions.

JEL-codes: C92 D83 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-hpe
Date: 2011-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: Sanctions that signal: An experiment (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Sanctions that signal: An experiment (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment (2010) Downloads
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