Nudges and Impatience: Evidence from a Large Scale Experiment
Wieland Mueller (),
Eline van der Heijden (),
Tobias Klein () and
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Wieland Mueller: http://www.univie.ac.at/Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Wieland Müller
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
We elicit time preferences of a representative sample of 1,102 Dutch individuals and also confront them with a series of incentivized investment decisions. There are two treatments which di¤er by the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment provides a nudge by stimulating decision makers to frame a sequence of risky decisions broadly rather than narrowly. We ?nd that impatient individuals are more ?nudgeable? than patient ones as the e¤ect of the treatment on investment levels is signi?cantly larger within the group of high discounters than within the group of low discounters. This result is robust to controlling for various economic and demographic variables and cognitive ability. This ?nding is interesting from a policy perspective because impatient individuals are often the target group of nudges as impatience is associated with problematic behaviors such as low savings, little equity holdings, low investments in human capital, and an unhealthy lifestyle.
JEL-codes: C93 D03 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
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