On the Clock of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
Maarten Janssen and
Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics
The Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) has been frequently used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clockphase with subsequent VCG pricing in order to maximize price discovery and eciency. We inquire into the role of the clock when bidders have lexicographic preferences for raising rivals' costs. All equilibria of the CCA are inecient if there is substantial room for price discovery, that is, if there is large uncertainty concerning the competitor's type. Conversely, in all ecient equilibria price discovery is limited. Qualitative features of our equilibria are in line with evidence concerning bidding behavior in some recent CCAs.
JEL-codes: D01 D44 D47 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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