Rock-Paper-Scissors and Cycle-Based Games
Eric Bahel ()
Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics
The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is proposed.
Keywords: cycle; Nash equilibrium; prudent strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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ftp://repec.econ.vt.edu/Papers/Bahel/RPS.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)
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Journal Article: Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-31
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