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Rock-Paper-Scissors and Cycle-Based Games

Eric Bahel ()

Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is proposed.

Keywords: cycle; Nash equilibrium; prudent strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
Date: 2011
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ftp://repec.econ.vt.edu/Papers/Bahel/RPS.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games (2012) Downloads
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