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Cycles with Undistinguished Actions and Extended Rock-Paper-Scissors Games

Eric Bahel () and Hans Haller

Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The present paper examines zero-sum games that are based on a cyclic preference relation defined over anonymous actions. For each of these games, the set of Nash equilibria is characterized. When the number of actions is odd, a unique Nash equilibrium is always obtained. On the other hand, in the case of an even number of actions, every such game exhibits an infinite number of Nash equilibria. As a special case, a proof of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game obtains.

Keywords: cycle; Nash equilibrium; minimax theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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ftp://repec.econ.vt.edu/Papers/Bahel/GRPS-6.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)
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Journal Article: Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended Rock–Paper–Scissors games (2013) Downloads
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