Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games
Eric Bahel () and
Christian Trudeau ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Richard Startz ()
Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics
For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate cost shares to the players according to some lexicographic preference relation. The average of all such lexicographic rules is shown to satisfy many desirable properties (core selection, symmetry, demand additivity,...). Our method relates to what Tijs et. al (2011) refer to as the Alexia value. We propose a procedure allowing to compute these lexicographic allocations for any shortest path game.
Keywords: shortest path; core; algorithm; lexicographic minima (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Stable lexicographic rules for shortest path games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-46
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