Network Vulnerability: A Designer-Disruptor Game
Working Papers from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics
We focus on the crucial role of network architecture in the defence against targeted attacks. A two-stage strategic game between a network designer and a network disruptor is analyzed. Given a set of nodes, the designer builds a network by investing in costly links. In the second stage, the disruptor deletes (possibly in a costly way) some of the links or nodes to reduce the designerâ€™s benefit from the network. General results deal with existence, uniqueness and comparative statics of Stackelberg (i.e., subgame perfect) equilibria. More specific issues are addressed under the assumption of a fixed budget for one or both players.
Keywords: strategic network disruption; strategic network design; strategic network games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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