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Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature

YiÄŸit SaÄŸlam
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Yigit Saglam ()

No 4115, Working Paper Series from Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation

Abstract: Auction models have proved to be attractive to structural econometricians who, since the late 1980s, have made substantial progress in identifying and estimating these rich game-theoretic models of bidder behavior. We provide a guide to the literature in which we contrast the various informational structures (paradigms) commonly assumed by researchers and uncover the evolution of the eld. We highlight major contributions within each paradigm and benchmark modi cations and extensions to these core models. Lastly, we discuss special topics that have received substantial attention among auction researchers in recent years, including auctions formultiple objects, auctions with risk averse bidders, testing between common and private value paradigms, unobserved auction-speci c heterogeneity, and accounting for an unobserved number of bidders as well as endogenous entry.

Date: 2012
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