Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments: Implications for Violent Crime
Russell Sobel and
Brian Osoba ()
No 09-09, Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University
We hypothesize the failure of government to protect the rights of individuals from violence committed by youths has led to the formation of youth gangs as protective agencies. Our theory predicts an opposite direction of causality between gang activity and violent crime than is widely accepted. While areas with more gang activity also have more violence, our results suggest gangs form as protection agencies precisely in areas with high violent crime rates. While gangs, like governments, use violence to enforce rules, the net impact of gangs is likely to lower violent crime. We test this hypothesis and offer policy implications.
JEL-codes: D74 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://be.wvu.edu/phd_economics/pdf/09-09.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://be.wvu.edu/phd_economics/pdf/09-09.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://business.wvu.edu/phd_economics/pdf/09-09.pdf)
Journal Article: Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wvu:wpaper:09-09
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Josh Hall ().