Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry
Joost Driessen (),
Pascal Maenhout and
Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management
We use a unique database on the ownership stakes and compensation of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors' incentive structure is related to fund performance. We find that governance plays an economically substantial and statistically significant role. The ownership stakes of both independent and non-independent directors matter for fund performance. Further, the various governance variables interact: funds with high director ownership outperform those with low director ownership only w
Date: 2005-03-01, Revised 2008-11-01
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Journal Article: Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incentives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:amz2470
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