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Are Workers Rewarded for Inconsistent Performance?

Anil Özdemir (), Helmut Dietl, Giambattista Rossi () and Robert Simmons ()
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Robert Simmons: Lancaster University, Management School, Department of Economics

No 386, Working Papers from University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW)

Abstract: This paper examines whether workers are rewarded for inconsistent performances by salary premia. Some earlier research suggests that performance inconsistency leads to salary premia while other research finds premia for consistent performances. Using detailed salary and performance data, we find that inconsistency is rewarded for some dimensions of performance, specifically those where creativity is important and outcomes have higher variance. We find salary penalties for inconsistent performances in those dimensions that are basic requirements of successful team production.

Keywords: physical salaries; performance; consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 M52 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2020-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-lma
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