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Details about Vera Angelova

E-mail:
Homepage:http://www.mikro.tu-berlin.de/menue/ueber_uns/dr_vera_angelova/
Phone:+49 (0)30 31423745
Postal address:Technische Universität Berlin Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre und Wirtschaftsrecht Fachgebiet für Mikroökonomie Straße des 17. Juni 135 10623 Berlin
Workplace:Fakultät Wirtschaft und Management (Faculty of Economics and Management), Technische Universität Berlin (Technical University of Berlin), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Vera Angelova.

Last updated 2016-10-17. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pan351


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Working Papers

2016

  1. Can a Bonus Overcome Moral Hazard? An Experiment on Voluntary Payments, Competition, and Reputation in Markets for Expert Services
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads
  2. Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental sender-receiver game
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads
    Also in Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (2012) Downloads View citations (3)
  3. Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads
    Also in TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2012) Downloads
    Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (2012) Downloads
    LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse (2012) Downloads View citations (3)
    Working Papers, CRESE (2013) Downloads View citations (1)

    See also Journal Article in Theory and Decision (2014)
  4. What renders financial advisors less treacherous? On commissions and reciprocity
    SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 Downloads
    Also in Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena (2010) Downloads View citations (7)

2010

  1. Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents
    Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads View citations (13)
    See also Journal Article in Labour Economics (2012)

2009

  1. Voluntary Cooperation Based on Equilibrium Retribution - An Experiment Testing Finite-Horizon Folk Theorems
    Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads View citations (2)

Journal Articles

2014

  1. Relative performance of liability rules: experimental evidence
    Theory and Decision, 2014, 77, (4), 531-556 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2016)

2013

  1. CAN SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM THREATS FOSTER COOPERATION? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF FINITE-HORIZON FOLK THEOREMS
    Economic Inquiry, 2013, 51, (2), 1345-1356 Downloads View citations (5)
  2. Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, 93, (C), 205-218 Downloads View citations (8)

2012

  1. Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents
    Labour Economics, 2012, 19, (1), 48-58 Downloads View citations (7)
    See also Working Paper (2010)

2010

  1. On the evolution of professional consulting
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2010, 76, (1), 113-126 Downloads
 
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