Details about Xavier Calsamiglia
Access statistics for papers by Xavier Calsamiglia.
Last updated 2012-09-25. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pca742
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Working Papers
2015
- Tobin Meets Oates: Solidarity and the Optimal Fiscal Federal Structure
Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics 
Also in Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (2010) View citations (3)
2006
- Why do Differences in the Degree of Fiscal Decentralization Endure?
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (1)
Also in Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (2004) View citations (1) Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics (2004) View citations (1)
1991
- A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes
Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra View citations (1)
See also Journal Article A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes, Econometrica, Econometric Society (1993) View citations (10) (1993)
Journal Articles
1993
- A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes
Econometrica, 1993, 61, (5), 1147-72 View citations (10)
See also Working Paper A unique informationally efficient and decentralized mechanism with fair outcomes, Economics Working Papers (1991) View citations (1) (1991)
1982
- On the size of the message space under non-convexities
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, 10, (2-3), 197-203 View citations (1)
1978
- Composite Goods and Revealed Preference
International Economic Review, 1978, 19, (2), 395-404
1977
- Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns
Journal of Economic Theory, 1977, 14, (2), 263-283 View citations (23)
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