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Details about Michael Finus
Access statistics for papers by Michael Finus.
Last updated 2009-07-28. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pfi120
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2009
- An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers, University of Stirling, Department of Economics View citations
Also in Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment (2004) View citations
- Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers, University of Stirling, Department of Economics
- The Role of Uncertainty and Learning for the Success of International Climate Agreements
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers, University of Stirling, Department of Economics
- Uncertainty and Climate Treaties: Does Ignorance Pay?
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers, University of Stirling, Department of Economics
2008
- Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy
Stirling Economics Discussion Papers, University of Stirling, Department of Economics 
Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2008)
- Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Also in Stirling Economics Discussion Papers, University of Stirling, Department of Economics (2008)
2006
- Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements
Working Papers, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics View citations
Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2005) View citations Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2005) View citations
2005
- Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
- Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
- Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
2004
- An Empirical Assessment of Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties*
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment View citations
- International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
- Modesty Pays: Sometimes!
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
- The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
See also Journal Article in Oxford Economic Papers (2006)
2003
- A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
- Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment View citations
Also in CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) (2003) View citations
- How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
- New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment View citations
Also in Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (2003) View citations
- Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations
See also Journal Article in Economics of Governance (2006)
Journal Articles
2009
- An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements
Environment and Development Economics, 2009, 14, (01), 117-137 View citations
- Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games
Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 32, (3), 389-406
2008
- DO ABATEMENT QUOTAS LEAD TO MORE SUCCESSFUL CLIMATE COALITIONS?
Manchester School, 2008, 76, (1), 104-129 View citations
- Modesty May Pay&excl
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10, (5), 801-826 View citations
- The enforcement mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol: flawed or promising concepts?
AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialstatistisches Archiv, 2008, 1, (1), 13-25 
Also in Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, 2008, 1, (1), 13-25 (2008)
- The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement
Environmental & Resource Economics, 2008, 39, (4), 357-377
2007
- Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2007, 7, (1), 73-97 View citations
2006
- A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2006, 162, (2), 329-346 View citations
- Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements
Journal of Applied Economics, 2006, IX, 19-48 View citations
- Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Economics of Governance, 2006, 7, (3), 271-291 View citations
See also Working Paper (2003)
- The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements
Oxford Economic Papers, 2006, 58, (2), 209-232 View citations
See also Working Paper (2004)
2005
- The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
Public Choice, 2005, 125, (1), 95-127 View citations
2003
- The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?
Journal of Public Economics, 2003, 87, (9-10), 2031-2048 View citations
2002
- Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game
International Tax and Public Finance, 2002, 9, (6), 687-707 View citations
2000
- Symbolische Umweltpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? - Zur Effektivität Internationaler Umweltverträge aus Ökonomischer Sicht
Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2000, 1, (1), 73-91
1999
- International Environmental Agreements: How the Policy Instrument Affects Equilibrium Emissions and Welfare
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 1999, 155, (3), 527- View citations
1998
- Playing a Better Global Warming Game: Does it Help to be Green?
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1998, 134, (I), 21-40
- Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient
Environmental & Resource Economics, 1998, 12, (3), 275-306 View citations
- Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control
Public Choice, 1998, 96, (1-2), 145-86 View citations
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