Details about Avner Greif

Access statistics for papers by Avner Greif.

Last updated 2009-11-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pgr24

Working Papers

2008

1. Contract Enforcement and Institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie
   CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich
   Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2008)

1997

2. On the Social Foundations and Historical Development of Institutions that Facilitate Impersonal Exchange: From the Community Responsibility System to Individual Legal Responsibility in Pre-modern Europe
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics
3. Self-enforcing Political System and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics View citations

1995

4. A Transactions-Cost Theory of Agglomeration Economies
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics View citations

Undated

5. Economic History and Game Theory: a Survey
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics View citations
6. Micro Theory and Recent Developments in the Study of Economic Institutions Through Economic History
   Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics View citations

Journal Articles

2009

1. The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif
   Public Choice, 2009, 141, (3), 273-275

2008

2. The Administrative Foundations of Self-Enforcing Constitutions
   American Economic Review, 2008, 98, (2), 105-09 View citations

2006

3. Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins and Implications of Western Corporations
   American Economic Review, 2006, 96, (2), 308-312 View citations
4. History Lessons: The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsibility System and Impartial Justice
   Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006, 20, (2), 221-236

2002

5. Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, 158, (1), 168- View citations

2000

6. The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis
   European Review of Economic History, 2000, 4, (03), 251-284 View citations
7. Trade, Trust, and Networks: Commercial Culture in Late Medieval Italy. By Gunnar Dahl. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 1998. Pp. 355
   The Journal of Economic History, 2000, 60, (01), 272-273

1998

8. Genoa and the Genoese, 958?1528. By Steven A. Epstein. 1996. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. Pp. 396. $45.00, cloth
   The Journal of Economic History, 1998, 58, (04), 1129-1130
9. Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis
   American Economic Review, 1998, 88, (2), 80-84 View citations

1997

10. Cliometrics after Forty Years
    American Economic Review, 1997, 87, (2), 400-403 View citations
11. United States and Canada Divergent Paths: How Culture and Institutions Have Shaped North American Growth. By Marc Egnal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. xvi, 300. $45.00, cloth; $17.95, paper
    The Journal of Economic History, 1997, 57, (03), 747-749

1996

12. The Study of Organizations and Evolving Organizational Forms through History: Reflections from the Late Medieval Family Firm
    Industrial and Corporate Change, 1996, 5, (2), 473-501 View citations

1995

13. A Mediterranean Emporium: The Catalan Kingdom of Majorca. By David Abulafia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. 292. $59.95
    The Journal of Economic History, 1995, 55, (01), 163-165
14. Medieval and Early Modern Trade and Traders in Muslim Spain: The Commercial Realignment of the Iberian Peninsula, 900?1500. By Olivia Remie Constable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. 320
    The Journal of Economic History, 1995, 55, (04), 923-924
15. Medieval and Early Modern Wage Labor & Guilds in Medieval Europe. By Steven A. Epstein. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Pp. vii, 307. $39.95
    The Journal of Economic History, 1995, 55, (02), 413-414
16. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. By Hendrik Spruyt. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Pp. 288
    The Journal of Economic History, 1995, 55, (04), 972-973

1994

17. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
    Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102, (4), 745-76 View citations
18. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies
    Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102, (5), 912-50 View citations
19. On the Political Foundations of the Late Medieval Commercial Revolution: Genoa During the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries
    The Journal of Economic History, 1994, 54, (02), 271-287 View citations

1993

20. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition
    American Economic Review, 1993, 83, (3), 525-48 View citations

1992

21. Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution
    American Economic Review, 1992, 82, (2), 128-33 View citations

1991

22. The Organization of Long-Distance Trade: Reputation and Coalitions in the Geniza Documents and Genoa During the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries
    The Journal of Economic History, 1991, 51, (02), 459-462 View citations

1990

23. Medieval and Early Modern Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250?1350. By Janet L. Lughod. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. xvi, 443. $35.00
    The Journal of Economic History, 1990, 50, (02), 455-456

1989

24. Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders
    The Journal of Economic History, 1989, 49, (04), 857-882 View citations

Chapters

2002

1. Economic history and game theory
   Chapter 52 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2002, vol. 3, pp 1989-2024 View citations