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Details about Avner Greif

E-mail:
Phone:650 725 8936
Postal address:Department of Economics Stanford University Stanford CA, 94305
Workplace:Department of Economics, Stanford University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Avner Greif.

Last updated 2008-05-03. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pgr24


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Working Papers

1997

  1. On the Social Foundations and Historical Development of Institutions that Facilitate Impersonal Exchange: From the Community Responsibility System to Individual Legal Responsibility in Pre-modern Europe
    Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics Downloads
  2. Self-enforcing Political System and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa
    Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations

1995

  1. A Transactions-Cost Theory of Agglomeration Economies
    Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations

Undated

  1. Economic History and Game Theory: a Survey
    Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations
  2. Micro Theory and Recent Developments in the Study of Economic Institutions Through Economic History
    Working Papers, Stanford University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations

Journal Articles

2006

  1. Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins and Implications of Western Corporations
    American Economic Review, 2006, 96, (2), 308-312
  2. History Lessons: The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsibility System and Impartial Justice
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006, 20, (2), 221-236

2002

  1. Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2002, 158, (1), 168- View citations

2001

  1. The fundamental problem of exchange: A research agenda in Historical Institutional Analysis
    European Review of Economic History, 2001, 4, (03), 251-284 Downloads View citations

1998

  1. Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis
    American Economic Review, 1998, 88, (2), 80-84 Downloads View citations

1997

  1. Cliometrics after Forty Years
    American Economic Review, 1997, 87, (2), 400-403 Downloads

1996

  1. The Study of Organizations and Evolving Organizational Forms through History: Reflections from the Late Medieval Family Firm
    Industrial and Corporate Change, 1996, 5, (2), 473-501 View citations

1994

  1. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
    Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102, (4), 745-76 Downloads View citations
  2. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies
    Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102, (5), 912-50 Downloads View citations

1993

  1. Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition
    American Economic Review, 1993, 83, (3), 525-48 Downloads View citations

1992

  1. Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution
    American Economic Review, 1992, 82, (2), 128-33 Downloads View citations

Chapters

2002

  1. Economic history and game theory
    Chapter 52 in Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 2002, vol. 3, pp 1989-2024 Downloads View citations
 
 
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