Details about Yolande HIRIART
Access statistics for papers by Yolande HIRIART.
Last updated 2013-04-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: phi120
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2012
- Relative Performance of Liability Rules: Experimental Evidence
TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 
Also in LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse (2012)  Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics (2012)
2010
- The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors
Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei View citations (3)
Also in PSE Working Papers, HAL (2009) 
See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2010)
2006
- The Benefits of Extended Liability
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole View citations (9)
Also in LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse (2006) View citations (8) IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (2005) View citations (2)
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2006)
- The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk
LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, HAL (2005) 
See also Journal Article in Revue d'économie politique (2008)
2005
- The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (5)
2004
- Aspects stratégiques d’une politique environnementale incitative
Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain), Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) 
See also Journal Article in Recherches économiques de Louvain (2004)
- Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse View citations (8)
- L'utilisation du droit pénal en matière environnementale
IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse
- On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability
IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse View citations (10)
Also in Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole (2004) View citations (9)
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2004)
Journal Articles
2012
- How much discretion for risk regulators?
RAND Journal of Economics, 2012, 43, (2), 283-314 View citations (2)
2011
- Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2011, (103-104), 25-42
2010
- L'ouverture aux échanges est-elle bénéfique ? Analyse en présence d'une régulation environnementale incitative
Revue économique, 2010, 61, (1), 79-102
- The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors
Journal of Public Economics, 2010, 94, (11-12), 1008-1019 
See also Working Paper (2010)
2008
- The Regulator and the Judge: The Optimal Mix in The Control of Environmental Risk
Revue d'économie politique, 2008, Volume 118, (6), 941-967 View citations (2)
See also Working Paper (2006)
2006
- The Benefits of Extended Liability
RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, (3), 562-582 View citations (15)
Also in RAND Journal of Economics, 2006, 37, (3), 562-582 (2006) View citations (9)
See also Working Paper (2006)
2004
- Aspects stratégiques d'une politique environnementale incitative
Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2004, 70, (1), 53-77 
See also Working Paper (2004)
- On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability
Economics Letters, 2004, 84, (2), 231-235 View citations (8)
See also Working Paper (2004)
2003
- Politique environnementale unilatérale versus politique bilatérale dans un modèle à deux pays
Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 2003, (70), 131-154
|
The links between different versions of a paper are constructed automatically by matching on the titles.
Please contact if a link is incorrect.
Use this form
to add links between versions where the titles do not match.
|